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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With the Hurricane Katrina debacle raising questions about public corruption's impact on disaster relief, corruption has once again become an important issue in American politics. This comment, however, analyzes not corruption's impact on disaster relief, but rather the impact that disaster relief has on corruption.
Disaster relief floods money and resources into the affected area, which provides public officials the incentive and opportunity to gain wealth through corrupt practices. Our analysis shows that states that receive more disaster relief also have more instances of public corruption.
Corruption not only hinders the effective management of disaster relief, but it also has long-term consequences for economic prosperity. More corruption is associated with lower growth and investment, and states that receive disaster relief often suffer from these effects.
When determining the best course of action, policy makers must remember that increased corruption is an unintended consequence of disaster relief. Increased oversight is unlikely to solve the problem of corruption because of the circumstances surrounding natural disaster. The time sensitive nature of the disaster relief means that protocol will take a backseat when disasters actually strike.
Policies that assume the federal government plays the primary role in disaster response are the most susceptible to corruption. Total elimination of public corruption generated by disaster relief will not be possible so long as FEMA relief exists. Any plan to reform disaster relief that intends to minimize corruption should recognize the role of local actors, presumably charities and business, and create space for them to react in time of crisis. Policy makers should recognize the consequences of disaster relief when dealing with urgent crises in order to make sure that they do not hinder the long-term prosperity of a community.
A key insight of economics is the unintended, often undesirable, consequences of government activity. Although the idea that government policy may create harmful secondary effects is well-known, too often when policy makers craft policies designed to promote the public welfare they seem to ignore these effects. This Policy We have organized this Policy Comment as follows. First, we discuss how public sector corruption adversely affects economic performance.
We then explain how FEMA-provided disaster relief increases public corruption. Next, we empirically consider the magnitude of FEMA's effect on corruption in the United States. In the last section of this comment, we provide the policy implications of our analysis. For instance, if prospective producers must bribe bureaucrats in order to start businesses, the resources they spend this way cannot be used to produce goods that would contribute to society's wealth. Recent work suggests that there is a "foreign aid curse" analogous to the "natural resource curse" discussed above.
A. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION
3 Like rich natural resources, foreign aid disbursements to governments in developing countries also create resource windfalls. These windfalls generate similar incentives and thus similar behaviors to those described above in the case of natural resources, including increased public sector corruption. Regional location may also be correlated with corruption. If, for instance, historical factors contribute to the level of corruption across states and these factors are clustered geographically, controlling for states' regional status will adjust for this.
B.2 FEMA-Relief Windfalls
Other forms of government spending, both at the state and federal level, may also contribute to the level of corruption in states. To account for this, the authors' study also adjusts for non-FEMA related state spending and non-FEMA related federal spending in each state.
Finally, it is important to account for the direction of causation. For instance, while the "windfall curse" reasoning discussed above
suggests that greater FEMA spending should increase corruption, it is also likely that states that are more corrupt have political actors who are more adept at corruptly attracting disaster relief resources in the first place. Political officials in a highly corrupt state, for example, may manipulate the appearance of the damage incurred following a natural disaster in order to attract more federal funds to corruptly appropriate. In order to correctly measure the impact of FEMA relief on corruption, however, an empirical examination must make sure that it isolates only the arrow of causation going from FEMA relief to public corruption, excluding the arrow of causation that runs the opposite direction.
Questions like this that deal with the issue of causality can be difficult to overcome in empirical analyses. Fortunately, we were able to address this issue by using a third variable, 10 private insurance property claims from natural disasters.
Our results confirm the "windfall curse" logic discussed above and hinted at by the anecdotal evidence pointed to earlier in this section. We can isolate the causal arrow of interest by examining the connection between something we know cannot be manipulated by corrupt political actors and FEMA relief and then using the part of FEMA relief explained by this variable to investigate the impact of FEMA relief on corruption.
severely hit by natural disasters, such as Louisiana and Mississippi, attract more FEMA relief than other states, making them more corrupt than these other states as well.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
If policy makers want to reduce the extent of pub- 
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